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tion up the Kennebec and the joint assault with Montgomery on Quebec, closing with a series of chapters on the long, weary fight out of Canada. Several following chapters deal with work of the committee sent by Congress, and the Lafayette campaign which Gates made a fiasco. Near the end is the great French-American scheme of co-operation in driving Great Britain from all her American possessions. There are a few plans of Washington's never carried out, and when at last the attempts to win Canada in the peace negotiations fail, the story ends. There is a good index and an uncritical bibliography.

C. H. VAN TYNE.

*Leading American Soldiers.* By R. M. JOHNSTON, M.A., Lecturer in History at Harvard University. [Biographies of Leading Americans, edited by W. P. Trent.] (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1907. Pp. xv, 371.)

THE thirteen chapters of this work are descriptions of the military careers of the thirteen leading soldiers in the history of the American colonies and of the United States. A just sense of proportion and perspective is equally characteristic of the work as a whole, and of the treatment of the several personages. The first two chapters, covering the Revolutionary War are devoted to Washington and Greene. The next three, carrying the reader to the Civil War, are given to Jackson, Taylor and Scott. Of the remaining eight chapters, five are assigned to Northern generals, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McClellan and Meade; and three to Southern generals, Lee, Jackson and Johnson. These chapters set forth in concise, fluent and effective language the principal achievements of their respective heroes, accompanied with brief general considerations of their merits or defects.

No attempt is made to link the chapters into a consecutive military history of the United States, or into a partial history of the art of war. The class of readers to whom the work is addressed may perhaps be judged from the fact that it contains but six small maps, and is set off with thirteen portraits. The delicate task of comparing the leaders one with another and pronouncing upon their relative ability is judiciously left to the reader. Owing, however, to the lack of maps and plans, the reader will be discouraged from following the author in his descriptions of operations, and be disposed to judge both the latter and the generals executing them by the estimate expressly or apparently placed upon them by the author. Whether he do this or form his own judgment with the aid of suitable maps, he will rise from the perusal of this work with a comprehension of American military character and history which he could hardly acquire from any other single work. He will be confirmed, if need be, in the recognition of George Washington as the Father of his Country, and of Lee and Jackson as the two greatest soldiers produced by the Civil War. He

will be impressed with the brilliancy of Scott's campaign in Mexico, and with the seriousness of the handicap imposed by political exigency upon the generals of a republic. The author's impatience, not to say intolerance, of the latter cannot be commended to an American officer aspiring to high command. There are statements of fact, too, and expressions of opinion, in which he is not altogether reliable.

On August 1, 1864, when Sheridan was detached from the Army of the Potomac to operate against Early in the Shenandoah Valley, Lee was not restricted, as is stated on page 218, to a single line of supply "running due west towards the valley of the Shenandoah". It is admitted a few lines further on that he still had an "avenue of supply and of escape" in the "line of rail running from Petersburg to Lynchburg". In addition, he had at this time the James River Canal, the Richmond and Danville railroad and the Weldon railroad.

It is stated on page 262 that Lee, in resigning his commission in April, 1861, "took the course that was followed by nearly every Southern officer in the United States army". At the outbreak of the Civil War most of the officers of the army were West Point graduates, and there are records to prove that one hundred and sixty-two who were appointed from the South, nearly half of the Southern graduates, remained loyal to the North.

In the Campaign of Chancellorsville, while Jackson was making his flank march towards Hooker's right, Lee remained with a fraction of his army in Hooker's front. This force the author gives on page 293 as a bare 10,000 men and on page 341 as only 10,000 bayonets. Allowing for losses in action the day before, the force under Lee must have numbered about 15,000 infantry besides six batteries of artillery (24 pieces) and a regiment and a half of cavalry.

It is stated that Jackson placed 25,000 men in line of battle in the rear of Howard's corps and of the whole Federal army. Jackson succeeded in placing about 20,000 infantry and some artillery on the flank—not in the rear—of Howard's corps. His artillery for the greater part, he could not use. Coming to the ignominious termination of this campaign, we read: "Hooker, for once, seized the opportunity and did the right thing with promptness: that night he decamped, and on the 6th of May was safely back on the northern bank of the Rappahannock." No greater blunder can be charged to Hooker than this final one. Had he been in position on the morning of his withdrawal, his long wished-for opportunity would have come. Lee would have attacked him on his own ground and would have been easily and sharply repulsed.

*The Writings of Samuel Adams.* Volume III. Collected and Edited by HARRY ALONZO CUSHING. (New York and London. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907. Pp. xvii, 419.)

THIS volume is in some respects disappointing. The first two volumes were so well filled with papers of the first consequence that